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Abstract: What determines the mechanism chosen to resolve a commercial dispute? To what 
degree does the aggrieved recover damages? And does the relationship survive in the aftermath?  
The answers to these questions affect expectations as to the costs of transacting and, thereby, the 
development of markets. But they have received almost no attention in the economic literature 
on the post-socialist transition. This article exploits a rich survey of small and medium-sized 
manufacturing enterprises in three post-socialist countries to explain behavioral responses to an 
inter-firm payment dispute. Particular attention is given to how the evolution of disputes is 
sensitive to both the geographic distance between trade partners and membership in a business 
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1.   Introduction 
Throughout history, the expansion of markets has depended upon the development of 
mechanisms to uphold agreements and resolve disputes. By raising the costs of non-compliance, 
effective enforcement institutions reduce the incidence of contractual violations, thus 
emboldening otherwise reluctant firms to widen their circle of trade partners. The post-socialist 
experience has re-focused attention on this fundamental lesson of “market building.” From mafia 
organizations (Frye and Zhuravskaya, 2000; Leitzel et al., 1995; Varese, 2001), to bi- and multi-
lateral reputation mechanisms (Hendley and Murrell, 2003; Johnson et al., 2002; Pyle, 2005), to 
the nascent court system (Hendley, 2001), transition countries developed, in relatively short 
order, a diverse array of institutions for imposing costs on parties that renege on commercial 
agreements.  
Although a fair number of studies describe these institutions and illustrate how they 
contribute to the expansion of markets, few have actually made what they are designed to 
prevent – commercial disputes – the unit of analysis.  In spite of the evolution of institutions to 
prevent them, commercial disputes still occur – and possibly with greater frequency.
2  When they 
do, we are not well informed as to what happens next: What determines the mechanism chosen 
to resolve the dispute? To what degree does the aggrieved party recover damages? And does the 
commercial relationship survive in the dispute’s aftermath?  It is not unreasonable to believe that 
the answers to these questions affect general expectations as to the costs of transacting and, 
thereby, the development of markets. Nevertheless, these questions have received almost no 
attention in the economic literature on the post-socialist transition. The one noteworthy study that 
considers the evolution of business disputes is based on a limited selection of case studies 
(Hendley, 2004). None, to our knowledge, use the power of large micro-datasets to address these 
matters.  
This article addresses this gap in the literature by shedding light on dispute resolution 
within a specific transitional context. Using a rich survey of small and medium-sized  
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manufacturing enterprises in three post-socialist countries (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 
2000), we examine responses relating to a firm’s most recent payment dispute with a customer to 
explore why some disputes end up in the courts while others do not, why some claimants 
eventually receive a greater percentage of the amount in question, and why some relationships 
survive in the aftermath.
3 An expected cost-benefit calculus is presumed to guide behavior at 
each of these several stages in the wake of an inter-firm dispute. The resolution method selected, 
for example, should depend upon the opportunity cost of going to court.  And the mutual desire 
to continue transacting after a dispute has ended should be determined by firms’ ex post 
evaluation of the relationship’s value.  This general approach leads to the identification of 
behavioral correlates at both the firm and relationship levels.   
Inspired by the economics research chronicling the development of enforcement 
mechanisms through history, particular attention is given to the roles played by both geography 
and institutions for inter-firm information exchange (North, 1990). An important theme from this 
literature is that the enforcement mechanisms that evolve to support arms-length transacting are 
sensitive to the geographic expanse of the market. Greater distances between parties give rise to 
greater transaction costs, which can be attenuated by non-public institutions that operate on the 
basis of reputational sanctions. Greif (1993), for instance, demonstrates how the rich flow of 
information among dispersed Maghribi traders reduced the risk associated with trade between 
Mediterranean Sea ports in the eleventh century. And Milgrom et al. (1990) show how the 
Champagne Fairs of medieval times developed mechanisms to centralize records of traders’ 
transactional histories, thereby discouraging breach of contract and allowing for identification of 
reliable partners from distant locales.  One contemporary analog to these historical institutions is 
a business association, a non-commercial organization designed to promote the general interests 
of members. Such associations may support the expansion of markets by improving relational 
contracting, which can be particularly valuable in environments with under-developed public 
institutions for contract enforcement (Doner and Schneider, 2000; Woodruff, 1998).  
The evidence presented in this article confirms that geographic distance raises costs 
associated with experiencing a payment dispute. The likelihood of recovering a debt is shown to 
drop in the distance between trade partners, particularly if an international border intervenes. 
Moreover, the probability of a relationship surviving a dispute, thus diminishing the need to 
search for and screen new partners, declines with distance.  These costs appear, however, to be  
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mitigated by business associations, which, our evidence suggests, play a role that complements 
the formal legal system.  Business association members are shown to recover a higher percentage 
of a disputed payment and are more likely to maintain a relationship in the aftermath of a 
disagreement. Though the mechanism through which associations reduce their members’ 
dispute-related costs cannot be precisely identified, the evidence presented here is consistent 
with the proposition that associations play an important role promoting inter-firm flows of 
information and, thereby, assisting the development of markets. 
The article is structured as follows.  Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on inter-firm 
payment disputes, business associations and the post-socialist transition.  In the third section, the 
data for analyzing the evolution of payment disputes are presented.  Sections 4 and 5 investigate 
the factors that affect, respectively, courts’ involvement and the dispute’s costs – in terms of un-
recovered payments and severed relationships – to the creditor. The final section presents 
conclusions and implications. 
2.  Payment Disputes and their Resolution in Comparative Perspective 
It is common practice for suppliers not to require customers to pay in full either in 
advance or at the time of delivery. Instead, they offer trade credit in return for a promise to be 
compensated at a later date.  In aggregate terms, these credits can add up to an impressive 
amount of commercial lending. Indeed, in a number of industrialized countries, the stock of trade 
credit (or accounts receivable) amounts to as much as 25% of firms’ assets and 40% of GDP.  As 
with loans of any type, suppliers offering trade credit assume a risk that they will not be fully 
paid off by the contracted date.  It is, after all, not uncommon for customers to fall into arrears. 
As much as one half of the stock of trade credit in many countries is overdue at any one time 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Schaffer, 1998).         
Inter-firm payment disputes are particularly well suited for comparative purposes. For 
one, they tend to be relatively straightforward and easy to resolve since the contractual violations 
and, thus, injury to the creditor, can generally be determined quickly and objectively (Djankov et 
al., 2003).
4 For another, they are among the most common types of commercial disagreements 
across a wide range of historical and geographic contexts (Kagan, 1984). In post-socialist Europe, 
inter-firm payment disputes have become a common feature of the economic landscape. Indeed, 
the patterns of both trade credit and inter-enterprise arrears that have arisen look like those  
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observed in more mature institutional environments.  Almost immediately after the fall of 
communist regimes and the dismantling of their managed economic systems, firms began 
extending trade credits to one another. Almost as quickly, they confronted the problem of 
overdue payments. Survey evidence from the early 1990s shows that deliveries to firms that fell 
into arrears would generally be stopped and that pre-payment was required from those for whom 
the capacity or willingness to pay at a later date was in doubt (Schaffer, 1998).  In other words, 
firms in transition countries took very little time to learn the cost of unpaid bills and adapted 
their behavior accordingly. They understood, in short, that payment disputes were to be avoided.   
When disputes have arisen, however, firms have been able to fall back on both private 
mechanisms as well as the public courts to work them out. Hendley and Murrell (2003) show 
that Romanian managers report that both bilateral relational mechanisms and the court system 
have been critical to preventing and resolving inter-firm disagreements. And Johnson et al. 
(2002a) implicitly confirm the same using firm-level responses from five post-socialist 
countries.
5  Although the speed with which the region’s court systems evolved to support 
commercial transactions has been impressive, their effectiveness has remained somewhat limited 
(Dietrich, 2000; Ramasastry, 2002).
6  Comprehensive studies released by the World Bank noted 
that many judges lack the expertise to reach suitable decisions or fall prone to corruption at the 
hands of powerful actors (Dietrich, 2000; Hellman et al., 2003).
7  Some courts, moreover, report 
being ill-equipped to enforce their rulings.
8 A recent survey of legal experts in over one hundred 
countries helps put some of these difficulties into a broader comparative perspective. The time 
costs of using courts to resolve simple payment disputes in post-socialist countries substantially 
exceed the norm in many parts of the developing world. In Poland, a country judged to have one 
of the region’s most advanced legal systems, the time needed to collect a bounced check is over 
four times the global average (Djankov, et al., 2003).
9  Nevertheless, relative to the enormity of 
the task, progress in the region has been impressive (Dietrich, 2000). As we will show in what 
follows, as early as the mid-1990s, the legal system in Central European countries was being 
used regularly to resolve payment disputes and, judging from firms’ actions and responses, was 
producing satisfactory results. Moreover, we will observe that public institutions have been 
complemented by private mechanisms that also have been developed to support market-based 
exchange.    
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With respect to private mechanisms, we draw attention in this paper to the effect of 
membership in business associations – private, non-commercial organizations designed to 
promote the interests of members.  While it has long been recognized that they may pursue rent-
seeking objectives that benefit their members to the net detriment of society (Smith, 1776; Olson, 
1982), recent research has highlighted how, particularly in countries with weak states, business 
associations offer services that complement markets and create net social benefits. Some offer 
formal dispute resolution services and many enhance relational contracting by collecting and 
disseminating information on firms’ reliability (Doner and Schneider, 2000; Macaulay, 1963; 
Woodruff, 1998).  For some commentators, it has thus become natural to think of these 
associations as substitutes to the public court system (World Development Report 2002). 
The relatively small literature on the impact of business associations in transition 
economies has not produced a clear consensus. Some present evidence that they help promote 
relational contracting (Greif and Kandel, 1995; Pyle, 2005; and Recanatini and Ryterman, 2001). 
Others, however, have generally downplayed their role in this regard or have suggested that their 
role in directly adjudicating disputes is minimal (Broadman et al., 2004; Hendley, 2001; Hendley 
and Murrell, 2003; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999a).
10    The reasons for the apparent 
disagreement are not altogether clear. Some may relate to the way in which different survey 
questions are phrased; some may be due to cross-country differences in institutional contexts. 
What is clear, however, is that the contribution of these organizations to reducing the transaction 
costs of their members remains an open question.  
3.  Data   
In 1997, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development sponsored a survey 
designed to study the difficulties confronting small and medium-sized enterprise development in 
transition countries.  Roughly one thousand manufacturing firms in Poland, Slovakia and 
Romania participated.
11  The lead investigators generated several noteworthy papers before 
placing the data in the public domain (Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan and Woodruff, 2000; 
Johnson et al., 2002a; Johnson et al., 2002b). 
In general, the average firm in the survey does not vary greatly across the countries. As 
shown in Table 1, in each of the three countries, it operates with slightly under a hundred 
employees and faces a not insignificant amount of competition. Most of the firms are owned  
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privately by nationals of the country in which they are located; indeed, no more than five percent 
of the respondents have in excess of one-quarter state or foreign ownership.  On average, these 
firms show a fair amount of turnover in their customer base, with roughly one-fifth of customers 
being new in the past year.  Only in terms of performance indicators do we observe much 
difference across countries. Well over 90% of the respondents in Poland and Romania report 
being profitable in 1996; whereas in Slovakia, performance appears not to have been quite as 
impressive.   
[TABLE 1] 
The EBRD survey addressed both experience with standard contracting problems as well 
as general attitudes toward mechanisms for enforcing agreements and resolving disputes.    As 
shown in Table 2, over three-quarters of respondents had had a customer fail to pay for a 
delivery. And roughly one-quarter had had problems with a supplier that refused either to accept 
the return of defective merchandise or to provide monetary compensation.  We should bear in 
mind that the quality of a country’s legal institutions may have an ambiguous relationship to 
these indicators (Bigsten et al., 2000).  An effective court system may deter opportunistic breach 
of contract in which case we would expect an inverse relationship between incidence of payment 
disputes and the effectiveness of legal institutions. On the other hand, a more effective legal 
system may embolden firms to engage in transactions that might otherwise have been avoided; 
for instance, they might be more willing to extend trade credit to a relatively new customer.
  
Perhaps a better indicator of the effectiveness of a country’s legal system is the degree to 
which courts are considered capable of upholding laws and supporting private contracts. Over 
three-quarters of surveyed firms in these three countries report that the court system can enforce 
an agreement with a business partner.  And as Johnson et al. (2002) demonstrated with this same 
database, this faith in courts is associated with a greater willingness to establish new trade 
relationships.  By extension, we would expect such faith to affect the use of courts when 
contracts are breached, particularly if alternative mechanisms are not considered viable. Indeed, 
relative to other public institutions as well as private contract enforcers, the data show that these 
still nascent and imperfect courts have established themselves as the most widely trusted 
enforcement mechanism. Even so, however, a non-trivial percentage of surveyed enterprises, 
roughly one-sixth, considers no institution capable of fulfilling this roll, and a similar number  
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report never having appealed to any third party to resolve disputes even though over four-fifths 
of firms expressed that they had experienced at least one of two standard types of contracting 
problems noted in Table 2.
 12  
[TABLE 2] 
  In addition to these general responses regarding their history with commercial disputes 
and their trust in and use of various enforcement mechanisms, survey respondents answered 
questions specifically related to the most recent payment dispute in which they were involved. 
We are thus able to assess the firm-level and relationship-specific correlates of how particular 
disputes evolve in a well-defined context. For the sake of standardization, we focus exclusively 
on those disputes that occurred in the two-year period prior to the survey, meaning that we drop 
from the analysis those firms whose most recent dispute occurred before 1995.   Moreover, we 
exclude firms who report on a payment disagreement with a supplier.  
Considering the large sample size, we have at our disposal a good deal of information 
about the respondent, the trade partner and their interaction. The summary data for the disputes, 
broken down by country, are presented in Table 3A.
13 As we observe, roughly 80% of disputes 
occurred with private enterprises. Roughly 60% occurred with partners located in or close to the 
same city as the respondent, while just over 5% were with firms located in other countries. On 
average, the firms involved had been business partners for eighteen months. We should note here 
that we do not have information on the monetary amount involved in the dispute. Since this may 
be related to behavior at successive stages of the dispute, we should be cautious in our 
interpretation of the regression results. That is, since the size of the dispute may be associated 
with the choice of resolution mechanisms, the fraction of the debt recovered and the decision to 
continue transacting ex post, we should evaluate our results in light of a possible omitted variable 
bias. 
[TABLE 3A] 
In each country, courts became involved in more than one-quarter but less than one-half 
of the reported disputes. In Poland, the rate of court use exceeded that in Romania by a factor of 
two, a finding consistent with the former’s higher ranking in a survey of legal system 
effectiveness conducted at the same time (Ramasastry, 2002). Firms in the region most 
frequently reported not having involved any third party, public or private, to resolve the dispute.   
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Only a very small minority report having used private agencies, either alone or in conjunction 
with the courts. 
In roughly one-sixth of the cases, the dispute concluded with respondents collecting 
nothing and writing off the customer’s debt completely. Half of the disputes ended with a partial 
recovery. And in the remainder, the respondents recovered the full amount that they were owed.   
For reasons that are not entirely clear, these data suggest that disputes in Romania were resolved 
in the supplier’s favor more frequently than in Slovakia and Poland. Finally, we observe that 
business partnerships survived a payment dispute in 36.7% of the cases, with the rates in 
Slovakia and Romania measuring roughly twice that in Poland.  
4.  Litigation 
A payment dispute may be thought of as a multi-stage process that may or may not 
proceed through the court system (Felstiner et al., 1980-81; Hendley, 2001).  After failing to 
receive payment in the contracted time frame, the seller will, almost always, make an appeal to 
the delinquent party.
14  The nature of this exchange can vary greatly. The seller can provide 
gentle reminders or make menacing threats; or the two parties may immediately enter 
negotiations to work out a new repayment schedule; or they may find some other alternative, but 
mutually satisfactory, resolution.  The seller might also choose to involve other private parties 
somehow, either to exert pressure on the buyer or to assist in some other way to resolve the 
dispute.  For instance, the seller may damage the buyer’s reputation by spreading information 
about the problem among other firms. Alternatively, private dispute resolution institutions could 
be called upon to provide mediation services. Whatever the exact mechanism, this preliminary 
step is distinguished by communications that remain outside of publicly sponsored channels.  
Purely private mechanisms, however, may not produce a satisfactory outcome from the 
seller’s standpoint. If this is the case, the grievance will either be dropped or transformed into a 
legal claim in which case the public court system will be asked to render a judgment. As a 
general rule, few business disputes actually end up in litigation. Most conclude at an earlier stage 
with the two parties reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement or the aggrieved dropping the 
claim. This is as true for countries with mature public institutions (Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989; 
Macaulay, 1963; Macaulay, 1977) as for those without them (Bigsten et al., 2000; Hendley, 
2004).   After all, the costs of going to court are rarely trivial.
  Often, these costs provide the  
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disputants with good reason to find alternative ways to resolve their differences. In addition to 
explicit monetary outlays, which may include lawyers’ bills and filing fees, the commitment of 
time to a court case can divert resources from a firm’s core, income-generating activities (Priest 
and Klein, 1984).
15 Indeed, the simplest commercial cases, like the recovery of a bounced check, 
can take several months to resolve even in well-functioning institutional environments (Djankov, 
et al., 2003).  
Additionally, a dispute may be kept out of the courts because of a lack of faith in the 
legal system’s effectiveness. Judges, for instance, may lack the expertise and experience to reach 
suitable decisions, thus making the outcome of litigation less predictable (Dietrich, 2000).
16  Or 
they might be prone to capture by powerful actors (Broadman et al., 2004; Hellman et al., 2003; 
Dietrich, 2000).  Or courts simply may be ill equipped to enforce their rulings.
17 As we observed 
already, such doubts in the legal system are not altogether uncommon in the post-socialist 
context.     
Given the discussion to this point, we would expect that the decision to take a dispute to 
court would hinge upon the macro-institutional environment – most notably, the effectiveness 
and accessibility of the court system. But the cost-benefit calculus, however, is just as likely to 
be influenced by more micro-level factors. The same firm may find different mechanisms 
preferable in different circumstances depending upon the characteristics of the other party and 
the nature of their shared relationship. For instance, since mutual goodwill and trust can often 
only develop in a relationship with time, longer-term business partners may have a greater 
capacity to cooperate and thus be more likely to settle disagreements amicably and outside of 
court  (Macaulay, 1963; Hendley, 2004).  
Geographic distance between trade partners may also influence the decision to resolve a 
dispute through the court system.  Trans-national discontinuities in legal systems, for instance, 
may make a supplier less likely to file suit against a delinquent customer based in another 
country (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Rodrik, 2000). 
Local courts may be unwilling and international courts unable to enforce agreements reached 
between firms from different countries. Indeed, some support for this notion is observable in 
Table 3B; the survey data show that payment disputes with foreign customers have been less 
likely to be resolved through the court system.  
  11
[TABLE 3B]    
Inside a single country, however, we have less in the way of theory or prior research to 
guide the generation of hypotheses. If intra-country jurisdictional boundaries raise the expected 
costs of enforcement, it might be natural to suspect that disincentives to litigate decrease with the 
distance between firms.  On the other hand, the closer two parties are in relationship to one 
another, the greater the potential role of alternative relational mechanisms for resolving disputes 
(North, 1990). With geographic proximity, that is, face-to-face negotiations may be less costly 
and reputational sanctions may carry greater weight. Thus, all else equal, the relative value of 
public mechanisms will not be as great.  In Table 3B, we observe that courts are more apt to be 
involved when disputants are in the same country but not from the same city. This is consistent 
with the proposition noted above that trade partners in close proximity to one another have a 
richer array of options for resolving a dispute.   
In transition countries, business associations have been shown to provide the basis for 
relational contracting (Greif and Kandel, 1995) by giving members access to a network of firms 
through which the behavioral histories of their trade partners can be transmitted. Pyle (2005) 
shows that the relative importance of business associations in channeling inter-firm information 
flows is greater when the offending and the aggrieved parties are located in different regions. 
Given their role in providing informational services that can potentially substitute for the legal 
system, we might expect membership in a business association to be negatively associated with 
taking a dispute to court (World Development Report 2002). On the other hand, business 
associations have been known to disseminate information about the legal system to their 
constituents (Doner and Schneider, 2000). In a rapidly changing institutional environment, there 
may well be economies (especially, to small and medium-sized enterprises) to a collectively 
sponsored organization that offers constituents legal consulting services. Indeed, both anecdotal 
and survey evidence suggest that business associations in post-socialist countries do serve 
exactly this function.
18 If this is the case, then business association membership, all else equal, 
may be positively associated with use of the courts. Moreover, Frye (2002) has shown with 
Russian data that firms belonging to business associations are more successful in influencing 
legislation, particularly at the regional and local levels.  Such influence may well extend to 
commercial courts. Indeed, Hellman et al. (2003) report that roughly one-fifth of firms believe 
that the sale of arbitration (commercial) court decisions in Poland, Romania and Slovakia has a  
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“significant or very significant impact on their business.”  Given all these considerations, it is not 
clear ex ante whether business association membership should positively or negatively influence 
the decision to take a dispute to court. 
[TABLE 3C] 
 
Larger firms may be more willing to absorb the fixed costs associated with bringing a 
case to court (Broadman et al., 2004).
19 There is evidence, for instance, that the confusing legal 
environment of the transition is more burdensome for smaller enterprises that do not have in-
house counsel or have fewer resources with which to “capture” judges (Dietrich, 2000; Hellman 
et al., 2003).
20 What is more, state ownership may increase the probability that a firm receives a 
favorable hearing and, with it, the attractiveness of going to court (Broadman et al., 2004).
21  
And it has been argued in developing countries that older firms possess greater familiarity with, 
and thus a greater disposition to use, formal legal institutions (Bigsten et al., 2000). However, it 
is not inconceivable that age, as well, brings greater appreciation for informal resolution 
mechanisms. Some, that is, have suggested that the primary beneficiaries of well-functioning 
courts are newer firms whose managers may not have well-established business or social 
connections and thus may find it more difficult to settle out of court (Hendley et al., 1997; 
McMillan and Woodruff, 1999a; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999b).  
On the basis of case study evidence from Russia, Hendley (2001) argues that a high 
degree of customer turnover correlates with greater rates of litigation since the cost of damaging 
a relationship through litigation is less if the search costs for new customers are comparatively 
low.
22 Moreover, it is possible that a firm taking on more new customers may receive greater 
value from a reputation as a tough bargainer and would, thus, be more likely to take disputes to 
court (Farmer and Pecorino, 1998).  
The legal studies literature suggests several other potential firm-specific correlates of 
litigation as the recourse for a commercial dispute. Cheit and Gersen (2000) note that firms in 
expanding industries are less likely to use litigation because the short-term value of winning a 
case in court will be relatively smaller when compared to the returns on resources invested 
elsewhere. Although, this conclusion was reached on the basis of sector-level evidence, the same 
logic of opportunity costs could be applied to individual enterprises. That is, investing time and  
  13
money in litigation will be more costly for firms whose core business is generating a higher 
return. And Kenworthy et al. (1996) argue that lower rates of market concentration are 
associated with lower rates of litigation. Firms that face a number of competitors will be more 
likely to litigate since they “can less easily afford to forgo opportunities for immediate gain, and 
their room for maneuver, and ability to sustain the cost of constructing and applying alternative 
sanctions are reduced.”  
Considering our discussion to this point, we now explore the determinates of using the 
court system to resolve a dispute in the following probit regression: 
Pr (yi =1) = Pr (β0 + β1Fi + β2Ri + β3Mi + εi > 0) = Φ (β0 + β1Fi + β2Ri + β3Mi), (1) 
where yi =1 if the dispute went before the courts;
 23 Fi represents a vector of firm-specific 
variables, which include the creditor’s membership in a business association; Ri is a vector of 
variables describing the characteristics of the relationship between the respondent and the 
customer, which include their geographic proximity; Mi represents a vector of macro-level 
variables, which include country and year-of-dispute controls; and Φ(•) is the normal cumulative 
distribution function.
 24 
Table 4A presents evidence that the use of courts to resolve payment disputes is a 
function of both the respondent’s membership in a formal business network and the geographic 
relationship between itself and the offending client.
25  In the specification presented in column 1, 
we observe that relative to the instance in which the delinquent customer is located in the same 
city, a firm is roughly thirteen percentage points more likely to take a dispute to court if the 
defendant is located near, but not in, the same city.  This relationship is shown to be even 
stronger when we restrict the disputes just to the subset that comprises parties that are located 
either in the same city or are otherwise relatively close to each other (see column 3). 
Column 2 reveals that relative to a customer located in the same city, the likelihood of 
taking a delinquent client to court is fifteen percentage points greater if that client is located 
elsewhere in the country. However, this is only the case if the respondent is not a member of a 
business association. In light of earlier research suggesting that business associations in 
transition countries enhance existing relational information flows with respect to non-local, 
domestic clients (Pyle, 2005), column 2 adds an interaction term to the base regression in column 
1. This new variable takes on the value of one if the respondent is a member of a business  
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association whose most recent payment dispute occurred with a firm located in the same country 
but in a region other than the respondent’s.  By its inclusion, we are presented with evidence 
suggesting that for non-association members, greater distance between disputants within the 
same country is associated with an increased probability of taking a dispute to court. But for 
association members, a problematic client located outside one’s locale is no more likely to be 
taken to court than one located in one’s locale. The negative and statistically significant 
association of the interaction term and litigating the dispute roughly cancels out the direct effect 
of the client being “located elsewhere in the country.” This evidence thus provides support for 
the proposition that business associations offer services that substitute for the court system with 
respect to distant, domestic relationships.   
However, with respect to a dispute occurring between firms located in the same region 
(i.e., the two are in the same city or are otherwise close by), the evidence suggests that 
associations may actually complement the formal legal system (see column 3).  Association 
members, that is, are roughly fifteen percentage points more likely to use the courts – an 
association that is significant at the 5% level. This finding contradicts the conventional wisdom 
that, with respect to contract disputes, business organizations provide services that solely 
substitute for public enforcement mechanisms (World Development Report 2002). How can this 
then be explained?  
Since we already possess evidence that associations contribute to inter-firm information 
flows regarding contract violators (Macaulay, 1963; Doner and Schneider, 2000; Pyle, 2005; 
Woodruff, 1998), it is not un-natural to suppose that they also enhance other types of information 
dissemination, including information regarding how to access and effectively utilize the court 
system. Indeed, as we noted above, both anecdotal and survey evidence from the region suggests 
that this is the case. An alternative explanation for the positive association between membership 
in a business organization and use of the courts could be that associations facilitate unjust 
influence over the legal process. Although our data do not allow us to definitively eliminate this 
explanation, we should note that our sample is not composed of those types of enterprises that 
have been shown to be capable of successfully influencing public actors in post-socialist 
countries – i.e., large, state-owned firms with a significant degree of market power (Hellman et 
al., 2003).
26 Rather, the sample here is made up of small and medium-sized private enterprises 
that face substantial competition.  
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The evidence that greater distance between disputants raises the demand for court-
supplied dispute resolution, ceteris paribus, is consistent with the suggestion of North (1990) 
that outside localized settings, the relative value of more informal contracting mechanisms falls. 
Certain types of relational contracting weaken across geographic space; periodic hounding of 
delinquent clients, for instance, may be a more costly or less effective strategy if they are in 
another town. The relationship between distance and use of courts, however, does not apply to 
disputes across national boundaries. International borders clearly diminish the net benefits 
associated with court-based contract enforcement  (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Anderson 
and van Wincoop, 2004; Rodrik, 2000).  
Finally, we observe that larger firms are much more likely to use the court system to 
resolve disputes, a result that mirrors findings from a recent study of African manufacturers 
(Bigsten et al., 2000). We also observe that controlling for the overall size of a firm’s customer 
base, having a larger number of new clients makes a firm more likely to resolve a dispute 
through the court system.  To the extent that a newer customer is more apt to be influenced by a 
signal of a “willingness to go to court,” the value of the signal will be greater the larger the 
number of new customers.  The positive association here could also be explained by the lesser 
value attached to specific relationships, and thus less interest in working toward a cooperative 
solution, when new customers are easily found.  Litigation, that is, may be less costly to 
suppliers who have an easier time finding clients.
 27 
5.  Debt Recovery and Relationship Survival 
The selection of the resolution mechanism does not put an end to matters. A court finding 
that the defendant is obligated to pay or a private agreement establishing a repayment schedule 
brings the dispute into the settlement phase. The seller then either passively awaits repayment or 
actively pursues the buyer through informal or formal means.  Finally, after the settlement has 
been implemented, the two parties decide whether to maintain their relationship. Although a 
decision to terminate it need not relate directly to the dispute, it is entirely possible that the seller 
no longer finds the buyer trustworthy or that the two no longer share the mutual goodwill 
necessary to engage in future transactions.  
The determinates of the transaction costs related to the incomplete recovery of a debt and 
the potential need to search for and screen new partners have received almost no attention in the  
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economics literature. However, it is not unreasonable to believe that they affect the firm-level 
calculus as to the costs of doing business when the probability of a dispute is not insignificant. 
From the perspective of a firm that may be in the position of being a claimant in a future 
payment dispute, the greater the perceived probability that such disputes can be resolved 
successfully and amicably, the less threat they pose to the expansion of market relations. If 
monies owed can eventually be recovered and/or if the search costs for new partners (associated 
with a severed relationship) can be avoided, the expected costs of a dispute will be less and firms 
will be emboldened to enter a wider array of arms-length transactions. 
5.1  Debt Recovery  
As with the selection of the appropriate mechanism to resolve the dispute, we anticipate 
that the recovery of the amounts owed will be influenced by both the geography of the 
relationship and the supplier’s access to an organization that expands access to mechanisms for 
relational contracting. Specifically, we anticipate that greater geographic distance between 
parties will decrease the percentage of the disputed amount that is recovered. With increased 
distance, the supplier’s costs of collecting a fixed amount are likely to rise. And the customer’s 
costs of reneging, specifically with respect to reputational damage, are likely to fall. Indeed, this 
relationship between the degree of payment recovery and geographic distance initially appears to 
be confirmed by evidence presented in Table 3B. Relative to a debtor abroad, nearly twice the 
share of arrears are paid off in full when the customer is located in the same city.  And for firms 
located somewhere outside the city of the respondent, the rate of complete write offs is roughly 
twice that for local debtors.  
We would also expect that if business associations do provide informational and 
consulting services that help resolve disputes, the members’ ability to recover debts should, 
ceteris paribus, be superior to non-members. And indeed, in Table 3C, we observe that members 
are more apt to recover their loss in full and less apt to write off the debt completely.   
In addition to the geographic and institutional determinants of the degree of payment 
recovery, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that the variables presumed to be associated with 
litigating a dispute would affect the willingness and ability of a claimant to recover an unpaid 
debt. We thus explore the effects of its size, age, ownership type, recent financial success as well 
as the nature of the market in which it operates; on the customer’s side, we explore the impact of  
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its ownership type and the length of its relationship with the claimant. In short, we expect that 
the supplier’s effort and ability to recover the payment as well as the customer’s willingness and 
ability to settle the matter amicably will depend on firm and relationship-specific characteristics, 
macro-institutional variables, and lastly, the mechanism chosen to resolve the dispute. The 
inclusion of a dummy variable for whether or not the dispute had been taken to court is likely to 
be a good proxy for the dispute’s severity (Macauley, 1977; Williamson, 1996).  
Considering our discussion to this point, we estimate the following in an ordered probit 
framework: 
Pr (yi =1) = Φ ( - (β0 + β1Fi + β2Ri + β3Mi+ β4Ei), (2a) 
Pr (yi =2) = Φ (θ1 – (β0 + β1Fi + β2Ri + β3Mi+ β4Ei)) – Φ ( - (β0 + β1Fi + β2Ri + β3Mi+ β4Ei)),   (2b) 
Pr (yi =3) = 1 - Φ (θ1 – (β0 + β1Fi + β2Ri + β3Mi+ β4Ei)), (2c) 
where yi =1 if the debt was written off completely, yi =2 if the debt was recovered in part, and yi 
=3 if the debt was recovered in full;
 Fi represents a vector of firm-specific variables; Ri is a 
vector of variables describing the characteristics of the relationship between the respondent and 
the customer; Mi represents a vector of macro-level variables, which include country and year-
of-dispute controls; and Ei is a vector of variables capturing the evolution of the dispute to this 
stage (i.e., a control for whether or not it was taken to court); θ1 (with θ1>0) is a threshold value 
for an unobserved latent variable measuring the respondent’s willingness and ability to recover 
the amount due; and Φ(•) is the normal cumulative distribution function.
  
Table 4B presents evidence that the degree of payment recovery is a function of both the 
respondent’s membership in a formal business network and the geographic relationship between 
itself and the offending client.  Regardless of whether we consider the full sample or the sub-
sample of intra-country disputes, we observe that business association members are more likely 
to receive a larger share of the debt owed by a customer.
28  Trade association members are 
roughly ten percentage points more likely to be compensated in full and six percentage points 
less likely to write off the debts completely; both effects are significant at the 5% level.  
Several mechanisms could explain this positive association between business association 
membership and the degree of payment recovery. First, some associations enhance existing 
informal flows of information among firms and thus provide constituents with a mechanism that  
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enhances reputation-based sanctions, which may increase customers’ incentive to re-pay. Second, 
some associations provide advice as to what constitutes best practices regarding dispute 
resolution that may raise the net returns from efforts to reach a favorable settlement. In both 
respects, business organizations can be thought of as serving as nodes within a network of firms, 
collecting and disseminating information produced by members’ experiences.
29  
As noted earlier, a potential alternative to the association as informational node 
explanation is the association as influence peddler. Because business association members in the 
post-socialist world have been shown to have greater influence than non-members over public 
institutions (Frye, 2002), we include a control for the interaction of association membership and 
the dispute having been taken to the court (see columns 3 and 4).
30 If the positive association 
between payment recovery and membership in a business organization is due to members’ undue 
influence over court decisions, we might expect the sign on this interaction term to be positive 
and significant and, possibly, the coefficient on the business association dummy to lose its 
statistical significance. However, columns 3 and 4 do not offer support for this political leverage 
explanation. The interaction term is not associated with payment recovery in a statistically 
significant manner and the coefficient on the association dummy variable remains positive and 
statistically significant.  That is, association members whose disputes were not taken to court 
recovered their debts with success roughly equal to those that litigated.  
Relative to disputes with foreigners, claimants seeking to settle debts with other firms in 
their country are much more likely to be successful. For instance, relative to a dispute with a firm 
abroad, a claimant whose client is in the same city is nineteen percentage points less likely to 
write off a debt completely and 37 percentage points more likely to be fully compensated – with 
both effects significant at the 1% level. This finding confirms earlier work suggesting that the 
costs of contract enforcement are an important component of the “border effects” that underlie 
the sub-optimal volume of trade flows (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2004).  Although the relative effects of distance are less pronounced within a country, 
we do observe in column 2 that relative to a client that is abroad, debts with firms are more likely 
to be settled in full the closer the two firms are to one another.    
In addition to the geographic and business institution effects, we observe that firms that 
are more than one-quarter owned by the state have more success in recovering their debts. A  
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state-owned firm may be able to bring more pressure to bear on a delinquent customer than 
another firm that is otherwise similar. Interestingly, we do not observe a similar state-ownership 
bias with respect to the customer. Indebted state firms, that is, are no less likely than non-state 
firms to pay off the amount in dispute. Perhaps the effect of increased bargaining power is 
negated, in part, by softer budget constraints; state-owned firms, that is, may face less of a cost 
for re-paying a given amount of debt.  
Less profitable firms are more likely to receive a greater percentage of a disputed 
payment. What perhaps initially seems counter-intuitive can perhaps best be understood as a 
function of the opportunity cost of diverting time and other scarce resources away from profit 
generating activities to debt collection efforts, the outcome of which may be highly uncertain 
(Cheit and Gersen, 2000; Priest and Klein, 1984).
31  Lastly, we observe the particularly strong 
negative association between use of the court system and an outcome that is satisfactory to the 
respondent, a finding that strongly suggests that only the most difficult cases are brought before 
the courts for resolution.      
5.2 Relationship  Survival 
Over sixty percent of the respondents to the survey reported that they no longer did 
business with the offending client (see Table 3A). The dispute itself may have been responsible 
by providing either (or both) firm(s) with information about the other’s intentions or capabilities, 
which then tipped the cost-benefit calculus in favor of termination.
32 The supplier, for instance, 
may have revised a prior belief about the client’s ability and/or willingness to pay bills on time.  
New information need not have been generated, however, for the dispute to end the relationship. 
Simply by eroding their shared stock of goodwill and trust, the firms may have recognized that 
the costs of a continued relationship would outweigh the expected benefits.  
Termination of the relationship may impose costs that the two firms might prefer to avoid. 
Resources potentially needed to search for and screen new trade partners, that is, could be 
deployed elsewhere.  All else equal, a dispute that does not lead to a relationship’s dissolution 
imposes less of a social cost. For this reason, in particular, we are interested in the relevant 
determinates of a relationship’s durability. As above, we highlight the influence of both inter-
firm distance and business association membership. With respect to the former, we presume that 
greater proximity of the parties increases the ease of reaching an amicable settlement, both  
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because the costs of communication decline and because the mechanisms for community-based 
sanctioning strengthen.  The potential impact of business association membership, however, is 
not altogether obvious. On the one hand, members of business associations may be more willing 
to give up on an existing relationship because an association’s information services may reduce 
the search costs for a new client. On the other hand, associations may provide members with 
access to information and other resources that increase the probability of reaching an amicable 
settlement.   
In addition to the geographic and institutional determinants, it is reasonable to believe 
that the cost to the two firms of terminating the relationship will be a function of the respective 
parties’ outside options. The more competitors the supplier has, the lower the cost to the client of 
severing the relationship; and the more potential clients the supplier has, the lower its cost of 
termination.     
We thus estimate the following probit regression: 
Pr (yi =1 ) = Pr (β0 + β1Fi + β2Ri + β3Mi + εi > 0) = Φ(β0 + β1Fi + β2Ri + β3Mi+ β4Ei), (3) 
where yi =1 if the relationship endures;
 Fi represents a vector of firm-specific variables, which 
include controls for both firms’ outside options and the respondent’s membership in a business 
association; Ri is a vector of variables describing the characteristics of the relationship between 
the respondent and the customer, which include their geographic proximity; Mi represents a 
vector of macro-level variables, which include country and year-of-dispute controls; and Ei is a 
vector of variables capturing how the dispute has evolved – i.e., whether or not it was taken to 
court as well as the degree to which the creditor was successful in recovering the money. 
Business association membership, again, proves to be associated with behavior at a 
critical stage in the evolution of a commercial dispute. Table 4C demonstrates that when 
controlling for behaviors in previous stages, member suppliers are over ten percent more likely 
to continue transacting with customers with whom they had experienced a payment dispute.    
We can only speculate as to the mechanisms at work here.  But given what we know about 
associations increasing the flow of relational information among firms, one possible explanation 
is that by having access to a network of firms (and the reputation-related penalties that it can 
impose), a supplier is more likely to face a compliant and cooperative client in repayment  
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negotiations. As such, there is a decreased probability that the dispute erodes the goodwill shared 
between the firms.   
Table 4C also demonstrates again geography’s important role. In the sample with all 
disputes (see column 1), we observe that firms whose partners are located “elsewhere in the 
country” are fifteen percentage points less likely than those with local partners (i.e., those that 
are based either in or near the city where the supplier is located) to maintain the relationship in 
the dispute’s aftermath.  In column 2, we see that this relationship appears to be driven by 
disputes that are decided in the courts.  Court-mediated disputes with non-local firms located 
“elsewhere in the country” are nearly 27 percentage points more likely to end in the 
relationship’s dissolution than those with local clients; this interaction effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
We also observe that relationships are less likely to survive when the supplier faces more 
local competition. In other words, when their clients have more outside options, the forces 
holding the relationship together will not be as strong. As anticipated, there is a negative 
relationship between the number of new clients a supplier has and the survival of the relationship. 
However, it is not statistically significant.  We also observe that state-owned customers that had 
fallen into arrears are more likely to be retained than their private counterparts, an effect that 
holds at the 5% level. As before, we may be picking up evidence that within the context of a 
dispute, state actors may be able to bring resources to bear that others cannot.  In this case, state 
officials might be in a position to pressure suppliers to continue making deliveries.
33  Finally, we 
observe that the prior evolution of the dispute has an impact on its survival.  Both a higher 
degree of payment recovery and out-of-court resolution are strongly and positively associated 
with the dispute not leading to the relationship’s dissolution.   
6. Conclusion 
By focusing on firms in three former socialist countries, we are able to observe the 
response to contractual disputes at a particularly critical stage of economic development. In the 
early to mid-1990s, many managers in post-socialist Europe were still learning about market-
based exchange.  It is natural to suspect that these initial experiences conditioned their thinking 
about the costs of transacting.  And these first assessments could be expected to have a lasting 
influence on the development of markets. If procedures for resolving disputes were viewed as  
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excessively burdensome or if amicable settlements were considered uncommon, the fear of 
broken promises and bitter disputes could seriously impede the subsequent development of 
markets. But if disagreements could be resolved at little cost and in a mutually satisfactory 
manner, firms would be more likely to widen the scope of their transactions with confidence.  
The evidence presented here suggests that one important lesson learned in the early 
transition is that the transaction costs associated with a commercial dispute increase if trade 
partners are located at a distance from oneself.  Our evidence also points to the conclusion that 
the cost of a given dispute can be mitigated by membership in a non-profit business organization. 
We should be careful not to draw from this finding that business association activity is net 
welfare enhancing. We have no grounds, that is, to dismiss the rent-seeking concerns that Smith 
(1976) and Olson (1982) expressed with respect to organized business. Some associations, 
however, do appear to offer valuable market-supporting services by complementing the domestic 
court system and reducing the damage done by payment disputes. These findings suggest that 
future research should explore why not all firms join these associations and why only some 
associations provide such services.    
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Table 1 . Summary Data on Respondents 
 All  Poland  Slovakia  Romania 
Employees  58.7 63.0 57.0 56.4 
Customers  97.7 99.7 86.0  107.1 
Customers new in past year  17.4  17.8  15.1  19.4 
Like firms in same city  8.7  10.7  6.5  8.8 
State owned (%)  4.9  7.3  2.3  5.3 
Foreign owned (%)  3.7  3.6  6.2  1.3 
Business association members (%)  34.7  28.9  31.5  44.2 
Profits as percent of sales in 1996 (%)         
  Negative  7.9  4.8  18.2  1.3 
  0%  4.6  2.1  11.0  1.3 
  1 – 10%  47.7  54.6  50.3  39.1 
  11 – 20%  29.6  28.3  14.0  45.0 
  21 – 40%  9.5  9.9  6.5  11.9 
  > 40%  0.7  0.3  0.0  1.6 
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 Table 2. Enforcing Agreements and Resolving Disputes in Eastern Europe  
 All  Poland Slovakia  Romania
Has a customer ever failed to pay for product after 
delivery? (% responding, “yes”)  77.4 76.2 81.5  74.5 
Number of observations  932 303 308  321 
        
Has a supplier ever refused to accept return of defective 
merchandise or to refund money for merchandise 
returned because of low quality? (% responding, “yes”)  29.9 18.5 37.3  33.4 
Number of observations  931 303 308  320 
        
Who can enforce agreement with a business partner?        
  court  76.1  72.9  67.9  86.9 
  national or local government 4.2  2.7  9.4  1.2 
  non-governmental organization 4.5  7.3  4.9  1.6 
  other  8.9  8.6  12.7  5.6 
  no one  16.7  23.8  20.6  6.2 
Number of observations  932 303 308  321 
        
If you had contract disputes in the past have you resolved 
them without third party involvement?       
  never  17.2  26.4  20.4  4.9 
  sometimes (<25%)  17.0  13.9  21.1  15.9 
  often (25%< and < 75%)  4.7  3.7  5.8  4.6 
  almost always (>75%)  14.9  11.4  20.4  12.7 
  always  46.2  44.7  32.3  62.0 
Number of observations  851 273 294  284 
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Table 3A. Most Recent Payment Dispute with Customer 
 All  Poland  Slovakia Romania 
Ownership type of customer   
     state (or mixed) enterprise  20.6  22.7  12.6  73.6 
     private enterprise  79.4  77.4  87.4  26.4 
Number of observations  573 181 191 201 
 
Location of customer   
     in same city  35.4  38.4  25.8  41.8 
     close to city  23.2  22.2  25.3  22.2 
     elsewhere in country  36.3  36.2  39.7  33.0 
     Abroad  5.2  3.2  9.3  3.0 
Number of observations  582 185 194 203 
 
Which organization(s) assisted?   
     Court  36.2  48.6  33.7  27.6 
     private (formal or informal) agency   4.3  6.9  5.4  1.0 
     court and private agency  1.1  1.1  2.1  0.0 
     no one  58.4  43.4  58.8  71.4 
Number of observations  558 175 187 196 
 
What was the final outcome?   
     wrote off debt completely    16.1 23.6 10.8 14.4 
     negotiated partial settlement  49.3  48.3  62.7  37.8 
     recovered loss in full  34.6  28.2  26.5  47.8 
Number of observations  560 174 185 201 
        
Is firm still a customer? (% responding, “yes”)  36.7  21.1 45.3 42.9 
Number of observations  580  185 192 203 
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Table 3B. Most Recent Payment Dispute with Customer 
 Same  city 
Near, not in 
same city 
Elsewhere in 
country Abroad 
Which organization(s) assisted?      
     court  30.5  42.7  39.2  24.1 
     private (formal or informal) agency   4.0  2.4  3.9  17.2 
     court and private agency  0.5  2.4  0.5  3.5 
     no one  65.0  52.4  56.4  55.2 
Number of observations  200 124 204  29 
      
What was the final outcome?      
     wrote off debt completely    10.8 19.4 16.4 35.7 
     negotiated partial settlement  47.7  47.3  52.7  42.9 
     recovered loss in full  41.5  33.3  30.9  21.4 
Number of observations  195 129 207  28 
      
Is firm still a customer? (% 
responding, “yes”)  62.3 62.2 66.4 53.3 
Number of observations  204 135 211  30 
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Table 3C. Most Recent Payment Dispute with Customer 
 
Trade association 
member 
Not trade 
association member 
Which organization(s) assisted?        
     court  38.7  34.8 
     private (formal or informal) agency   2.8  5.2 
     court and private agency  2.4  0.3 
     no one  56.1  59.7 
Number of observations  212 345 
        
What was the final outcome?    
     wrote off debt completely   11.8  18.7 
     negotiated partial settlement  47.2  50.4 
     recovered loss in full  41.0  30.8 
Number of observations  212 347 
      
Is the firm still a customer? (% responding, “yes”) 43.6 32.6 
Number of observations  220 359  
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Table 4A. Did Court Assist in Resolving Most Recent Payment Dispute with Customer 
 
 
 
All Disputes  All Disputes  Disputants located 
either close to or in 
same city 
Supplier characteristics     
0.063 0.130**  0.149**  Trade association membership 
(1.24) (2.13) (2.22) 
0.054 0.055 0.085  Log age  
(1.22) (1.25) (1.46) 
0.053** 0.054**  0.053  Log employees 
(1.99) (2.02) (1.42) 
0.131 0.122 0.062  > 25% state owned 
(1.23) (1.14) (0.51) 
-0.018 -0.020 -0.210  > 25% foreign owned 
(0.15) (0.16) (1.44) 
0.005 0.006 0.011  Log customers 
(0.14) (0.16) (0.21) 
0.060* 0.063*  0.060  Log customers new in past year 
(1.69) (1.78) (1.14) 
0.004 0.004 -0.014  Log firms located in same city 
(0.19) (0.21) (0.50) 
-0.025 -0.027 -0.006  Profitability in previous year 
(0.94) (0.99) (0.16) 
Relationship / customer 
characteristics 
   
0.130** 0.131** 0.155**  Located close to, but not in, 
same city as supplier  (1.99) (1.99) (2.23) 
0.076 0.156**    Located elsewhere in country 
(1.18) (2.06)   
0.057 0.071    Located abroad 
(0.41) (0.51)   
-0.010 -0.012  -0.047**  Log months a customer 
(0.60) (0.74) (2.14) 
-0.030 -0.034 -0.005  State owned 
  (0.49) (0.56) (0.06) 
Distance and institutional 
interaction 
   
 -0.166*   Located elsewhere x trade 
association membership    (1.84)   
     
Country of supplier control  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector of supplier control  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Additional  supplier  controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Year of dispute control  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     
Prob  >  chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of observations  504  504  301 
Pseudo  R-square  .1234 .1285 .2260 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from the probit regression are reported; * indicates 0.10 level, ** 0.05 level, *** 0.01 level.; 
absolute value of t-stats reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4B. Degree of Payment Recovery (Zero, Partial or Full) 
  
  All Disputes    Disputants located  
in same country 
  Debt fully 
written off 
Debt fully 
recovered 
 Debt  fully 
written off 
Debt fully 
recovered 
Supplier characteristics         
-.056** .097**    -.050*  .090*  Trade association membership 
(2.30) (2.24)  (1.71) (1.67) 
-.003 .004   -.001 .001  Log age  
(0.11) (0.11)  (0.03) (0.03) 
.009 -.014   .011 -.019  Log employees 
(0.61) (0.60)  (0.79) (0.79) 
-.087*** .202*   -.074**  .176  > 25% state owned 
(2.59) (1.84)  (2.20) (1.64) 
.022 -.034   .030 -.049  > 25% foreign owned 
(0.31) (0.33)  (0.41) (0.45) 
-.048*** .080**    -.044**  .079**  Log customers 
(2.60) 2.54   (2.47) 2.41 
.049*** -.082***    .045**  -.080**  Log customers new in past year 
(2.72) (2.69)  (2.53) (2.51) 
.005 -.009   .008 -.013  Log firms located in same city 
(0.52) (0.52)  (0.75) (0.75) 
.041*** -.069***    .039*** -.069***  Profitability in previous year 
(3.23) (3.17)  (3.10) (3.05) 
Relationship / customer 
characteristics 
       
-.190*** .369***    -.044  .081  Located in same city as supplier 
(3.47) (3.24)  (1.48) (1.43) 
-.144*** .320***    -.020  .037  Located close to but not in same city 
(3.37) (2.66)  (0.68) (0.65) 
-.145*** .276**        Located elsewhere 
(2.63) (2.41)      
-.008 .014   -.006 .011  Log months a customer 
(1.01) (1.02)  (0.77) (0.77) 
-.021 .036   -.017 .031  State owned 
  (0.71) (0.68)  (0.60) (0.58) 
Evolution of dispute        
Did court help resolve  .117***  -.174***    .139***  -.215*** 
  (3.70) (4.30)  (3.38) (3.95) 
     -.040  .078  Did court help resolve x trade 
association membership        (0.99)  (0.89) 
        
Country of supplier control  Yes    Yes 
Sector of supplier control  Yes    Yes 
Additional supplier controls  Yes    Yes 
Year of dispute control  Yes    Yes 
        
Prob > chi2  0.0000    0.0000 
Number of observations  490    465 
Pseudo R-square  .0814    .0772 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from the ordered probit regression are reported but only for the “extreme” outcomes (i.e., not 
for partial debt recovery); because of a small number of observations, three of ten sectors were combined allowing 
STATA to compute the marginal effects for the ordered probit; * indicates 0.10 level, ** 0.05 level, *** 0.01 level.; 
absolute value of t-stats reported in parentheses.  
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 Table 4C. Relationship Maintained after the Dispute 
 
 
 
All Disputes  Disputants located  
in same country 
Supplier characteristics     
0.103* 0.104*  Trade association membership 
(1.92) (1.96) 
-0.027 -0.037  Log age  
(0.55) (0.73) 
0.033 0.026  Log employees 
(1.13) (0.92) 
0.052 0.075  > 25% state owned 
(0.42) (0.60) 
0.113 0.089  > 25% foreign owned 
(0.91) (0.65) 
0.022 0.032  Log customers 
(0.58) (0.83) 
-0.029 -0.037  Log customers new in past year 
(0.80) (0.98) 
-0.042* -0.046**  Log firms located in same city 
(1.83) (2.05) 
0.042 0.050*  Profitability in previous year 
(1.45) (1.71) 
Relationship / customer characteristics  
-0.150*** -0.061  Located elsewhere 
(2.79) (0.93) 
0.203   Located abroad 
(1.54)  
-0.029* -0.024  Log months a customer 
(1.69) (1.37) 
0.165** 0.148**  State owned 
 (2.54)  (2.32) 
Distance and institutional interaction    
 -0.267***  Located elsewhere x did court 
help resolve    (2.80) 
Evolution of dispute    
Did court help resolve  -0.327***  -0.232*** 
 (6.32)  (3.44) 
0.131*** 0.132***  Degree to which payment 
recovered (3.60)  (3.58) 
     
Country of supplier control  Yes  Yes 
Sector of supplier control  Yes  Yes 
Additional supplier controls  Yes  Yes 
Year of dispute control  Yes  Yes 
     
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of observations  489  464 
Pseudo R-square  .2612  .2692 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from the probit regression are reported; (i) * indicates 0.10 level, ** 0.05 level, *** 0.01 level.; 
absolute value of t-stats reported in parentheses.   
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1 The author would like to thank Timothy Frye, Peter Matthews and seminar participants at 
Middlebury College for their helpful comments. 
2 Better institutions encourage firms to engage in transactions that they might have otherwise 
avoided and though they may lower the probability that any given transaction will lead to a 
dispute, they may increase the number of transactions and, thereby, the number of disputes. 
3  In addition to the cited article, which provides the most comprehensive description of the 
survey project, Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, the lead investigators published a number of 
noteworthy articles using these data (Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan and Woodruff, 2000; 
Johnson et al., 2002a; and Johnson et al., 2002b) before placing them in the public domain. 
4 Hendley (2004), moreover, contends that their relative simplicity makes them more transparent 
and thus less prone to corrupt influences if resolved in government courts.  
5 These authors demonstrate that firms’ expression of confidence in the courts and their use of 
common modes of relational contracting are associated with a greater willingness to initiate 
dealings with new, price-competitive suppliers and to extend trade credit to existing customers. 
6 In 1997, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development assessed the cross-country 
variation in legal system by directly querying a number of legal experts familiar with the region.  
On a four-point scale, a plurality of former socialist countries scored a 2 in 1997, indicating that 
“[c]ommercial legal rules are generally unclear and sometimes contradictory.” Two countries 
that feature in our analysis, Romania and Slovakia, rated a 3, meaning that though “commercial 
legal rules are reasonably clear, administration or judicial support of the law appears to be often 
inadequate or inconsistent.”  The legal experts gave Poland the highest rank; its commercial laws 
were judged to be “reasonably clear and [its] administrative and judicial support of the law is 
reasonably consistent.” 
7 Judges in Poland have complained about the difficulties of keeping up with changes to the law. 
And many judges are appointed right out of law school and have little practical understanding of 
business affairs. One lawyer commented to a Western expert conducting a study for the World 
Bank (Dietrich, 2000) that “Sometimes things are too complicated for the judges…They are very  
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young, and receive a very good theoretical education, but they do not understand how business 
works.’ 
8 One Polish official noted the country’s problem with collecting debts, explaining it as a legacy 
of the communist system in which “debtors received more protection than creditors.” Bailiffs 
were prone to being influenced by the debtors (Dietrich, 2000). 
9 This project collected data from questionnaires answered by attorneys at leading law firms in 
109 countries.  Questions addressed the evolution of a check collection procedure before the 
local courts in the country’s largest city.   
10  On the basis of data collected through Business Environment and Economic Performance 
Survey in 2002, Broadman et al. (2004) report that only 10% of Romanian firms that are 
association members report that an association to which they belong “provides major or critical 
value in resolving disputes.” The authors, however, do note that there are some firms in the 
region that have used chambers of commerce because local courts are slow. These inquiries do 
not appear to touch on associations’ role in supporting relational contracting.    
11 Surveys were also administered in Russia and Ukraine but the coverage of payment dispute 
specifics was much more limited; indeed, several of the relevant questions appear not even to 
have been asked. In Poland, the respondents were firms in Katowice; in Romania, Brasov; and in 
Slovakia, roughly half of the firms were from Kosice and Bratislava with the rest coming from 
one of seven other cities. The firms represented the following branches within manufacturing: 
metal, wood, food and chemical products, clothes, construction materials, paper and packaging, 
handicrafts and electrical machinery.       
12 The pattern of cross-country variation here is a bit surprising. Notably Poland, which by some 
accounts had the region’s most sophisticated legal system (Ramasastry, 2002), has a relatively 
high percentage of firms that express no confidence in formal contract enforcement institutions; 
Romania, however, which is widely considered to have been a relative laggard in terms of 
institutional development, has courts that inspire the most confidence. Also somewhat 
surprisingly, there appears to be an inverse relationship at the country level between the belief 
that no third parties can enforce agreements and the choice not to use third parties to enforce 
contracts.  Notably, relative to those in Poland and Slovakia, a lesser percentage of Romanian  
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firms actually report calling on other organizations to help them resolve disputes even though a 
greater percentage report having confidence in the ability of third parties, including courts, to 
enforce contracts. 
13 The response “local government” is merged with “court” given the small numbers – 0.8% of 
all firms – associated with the former. 
14 Of course, it is possible that a seller does not inform the buyer of his grievance in which case 
the dispute never goes beyond the first stage. Felstiner et al. (1980-81) refer to the occurrence of 
the violation as the first – or the “naming” – stage. A subsequent appeal to the buyer is referred 
to as the “blaming” stage.  We think it unlikely that the respondents to the survey – answering 
questions about “your most recent payment dispute” with a customer – would have thought of 
incidents that progressed no further than this first stage.  Felstiner et al. include any appeals to 
private mediators as a part of this blaming stage.    
15 As part of the Lex Mundi project (Djankov et al., 2003), lawyers in a number of countries were 
asked about a hypothetical case in which a creditor tries to use the court system to collect an 
overdue payment – equal to .5% of GNI per capita – on a fulfilled contract.  In Romania, for 
instance, this would amount to a debt of $830. Expected attorney fees in such a case would be 
roughly $120 and expected court fees would be roughly $8 (Broadman et al., 2004). Dietrich 
(2000) points out that that filing fees have excluded some parties from accessing courts in 
transition economies. And in Poland, he notes that judges have been reluctant to waive these fees 
because they constitute an important source of funding for the courts. In the exceptions when 
they are waived, it is through ex parte negotiations between litigants and judges, thus raising the 
potential for corruption. 
16 Judges in Poland have complained about the difficulties of keeping up with changes to the law. 
And many judges are appointed right out of law school and have little practical understanding of 
business affairs. One lawyer commented to a Western expert conducting a study for the World 
Bank (Dietrich, 2000) that “[s]ometimes things are too complicated for the judges…They are 
very young, and receive a very good theoretical education, but they do not understand how 
business works.”   
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17 One Polish official noted the country’s problem with collecting debts, explaining it as a legacy 
of the communist system in which “debtors received more protection than creditors.”  
18 The author’s conversations with personnel at the Center for International Private Enterprise 
(an independent, non-profit affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that offers assistance to 
nascent business organizations through the post-socialist world) confirmed that many of the 
associations in Poland, Slovakia and Romania provide constituents with a regular flow of 
information on the evolving legal system.  Moreover, in a survey of 200 business associations 
conducted by the author in Russia in the summer of 2004, 85% reported offering their clients 
information related to changes in laws and regulations. When asked to evaluate the importance 
of this service to their members, the mean response of the association managers on a Likert scale 
from 1 (“not at all important”) to 5 (“extremely important”) was 4.41.   
19  The authors find that 81% of small firms in the BEEPS survey (fewer than 50 full-time 
employees), 57% of medium-size firms (50 – 249) and 38% of large firms report that report that 
none of their payment disputes were resolved in court.  
20 Broadman et al. (2004) present evidence that small firms are particularly unlikely to have in-
house counsel. 
21 Broadman et al. (2004) find that state firms, across the region, are more informed about laws 
and regulations and that they find courts’ interpretations of them more consistent and predictable. 
They also report that state-owned firms have a higher proportion of payment disputes resolved in 
court. We should note, however, that these are bilateral relationships. 
22 Hendley (2004) finds that 14% of firms filing suit in Russian non-payment cases filed the suit 
in order to “send a message to other customers that not paying is unacceptable?” She argued the 
number was not higher because case decisions are not published and, therefore, are unlikely to 
become known to third parties. 
23 The dependent variable takes on the value of 0 if the dispute was resolved either without any 
outside assistance or with the help of a private agency – with the latter constituting less than 5% 
of all reported payment disputes.  
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24 We exclude from the analysis the five firms that used both the court system and a private 
agency. 
25 In this and all subsequent regressions, controls are included for the percentage of the firm’s 
total sales made to customers of different ownership types (e.g., state enterprise, privatized firms, 
greenfields, etc.) and client locations vis a vis the firm (e.g., in the same city, elsewhere in the 
country, abroad). 
26 It might be presumed that willingness to join a business organization is a proxy for willingness 
to operate in the formal sector of the economy. The positive association between business 
association membership and using the courts might thus be explained by this third variable. 
However, when running the models presented in Table 4A with a variable that has been used by 
others to capture informality – hidden sales as a percentage of actual sales for “firms in your 
industry” (Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan and Woodruff, 2000) – the magnitude and statistical 
significance of our variables of interest do not change in the least. 
27 There are also some noteworthy macro-level effects. Firms in Romania are much less likely to 
rely upon the court system in resolving a dispute than are firms in Poland; this is consistent with 
the evaluation of legal experts that the Polish court system is more effective than the Romanian. 
Moreover, we should note that disputes that occurred earlier are more likely to have ended up in 
court. Since the language of the survey makes clear that the questions refer to disputes that have 
ended or been resolved, this finding suggests that contrary to conventional wisdom, recourse to 
courts for a standard business dispute is becoming less common with time.  This perhaps can be 
understood as a result of a greater understanding of the costs of litigation or more experience 
with non-litigious mechanisms for dispute resolution. 
28 The role of association membership is not sensitive to the geographic distance between the 
firms in the manner observed in the litigation regressions – i.e., there is no statistically significant 
effect of the interaction between association membership and the customer being located 
“elsewhere in the country.” 
29  In another variant of the association-as-informational-node story, there is a good deal of 
evidence that business organizations provide members with access to information about the 
reliability of business partners (Macaulay, 1963; Doner and Schneider, 2000; Pyle, 2005;  
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Woodruff, 1998). It is thus possible that association members are more likely to be involved in 
disputes with customers that experience only temporary as opposed to permanent payment 
difficulties.  In other words, business association membership may be correlated with the 
dispute’s severity, a variable that we do not observe.   
30 The inclusion of this control makes more sense within the context of a model restricted to 
intra-country disputes. We have no reason to believe that business associations from one country 
can exercise influence over public institutions in another. 
31 Firms that have established relationships with fewer new customers in the past year are more 
likely to have satisfactorily resolved their dispute.  It is possible that, ceteris paribus, a firm with 
less turnover in its client base is able to devote more resources to screening per each new 
customer.  This may mean that they are more likely than those that screen less to be dealing with 
more reliable customers whose payment difficulties are relatively more likely to be temporary 
than permanent.  That is, again, a variable may be proxying for the dispute’s severity. 
32  The termination of the relationship may have been due to circumstances unrelated to the 
dispute, but the data, however, do not allow us to distinguish these cases. We only know whether 
or not the firm in question remained a customer of the respondent at the time of the survey. 
33 We also see some evidence that firms that have a long and enduring relationship are more 
likely to have that relationship derailed in the aftermath of a payment dispute.  Although the 
statistical significance of this finding does not hold up in the model that includes just intra-
country disputes (see column 2), this is a surprising result, since it has been suggested that longer 
relationships allow partners to build up a better capacity to cooperate and work through 
difficulties (Macaulay, 1963; Macaulay, 1977).  Moreover, one might suspect that in a long 
relationship, the impact of one piece of information – a single unpaid bill – would be less 
damaging to the supplier’s evaluation of the customer than in a relationship in which the parties 
share less of a history together.  
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